### 1NC Russia SOI

**A. Uniqueness – US Russia relations are high now but increasingly fragile**

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**(Vladimir, 2/20/12, Russian International Affairs Council, “Is Russia returning to Latin America?” http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id\_4=252#top, 7/6/13, ND)**

**Latin American region has recently been often mentioned among new priority dimensions of Russian foreign policy**. Despite the difficulties of both objective and subjective nature, the comeback of Russia to Latin America can provide it with new reliable partners and strengthen its position in a nascent multi-polar world.¶ The nineties can be regarded as lost years for Russian policy in Latin America. In fact, Russia didn’t pursue any policy there. Traditionally, as in the Soviet times, this region stood low on the national foreign policy agenda. Of course, there have been undertaken some successful actions – for example, in 1996-1997 Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov paid visits to the region during which the whole **package of agreements on cooperation with Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela**, Argentina, Colombia, and, most importantly, with Brazil (about strategic partnership in the 21 century and creation of a greater Russia-Brazil committee) **were signed**. But these actions were only sporadic, and the signed agreements turned out to be suspended.¶ What is more, it was in the early 1990-s after Russia’s withdrawal from Cuba, with abandoning the construction of about 500 major facilities and decreasing 30-fold trade turnover with this country [1], when West-oriented Russia started to be perceived in Latin America as an unreliable partner. The U-turn in Russian foreign policy after 9/11 contributed to it greatly. Having declared about the readiness of Russia to join the US-sponsored anti-terrorist coalition, President Putin on October 17, 2001 announced the withdrawal of the country from the only overseas strategic site - surveillance radar station in Lurdes on the outskirts of Havana – without prior notification of the Cuban side [2].¶ Make-or-break moment in the relationships with Latin America region countries occurred in the wake of the Yeltzin era. Latin American countries themselves seem to have contributed a lot to it. Already in 1999 the Rio Group uniting the region’s leading states turned out to be, actually, the only grouping in the world which condemned the bombing of Yugoslavia and pointed out in its declaration specific articles of the UN Charter violated by the NATO member- states [3]. In February 2003 Mexico and Chili as non-permanent UN SC members, in fact, vetoed the second Anglo-American resolution authorizing Iraq intervention, despite their economic dependence on the USA.¶ These actions seem to have made the Kremlin look at the perspectives of cooperation with Latin American countries at a new angle. Thus, in March 2003 President Putin received in Kremlin the delegation of the Rio Group and held official talks with them. Both sides agreed not to confine themselves to regular contacts (launched in 1995) within the framework of the UN General Assembly, but also conduct meetings in Russia and countries of the Group member-states.¶ By mid-decade the exchange of high level delegations between the sides had intensified. Only one example, in November 2008 President Medvedev visited four countries during his tour of the region - Peru, Brazil, Venezuela and Cuba.¶ Commenting on his visit, President **Medvedev remarked: “…we visited the states which previous Russian leaders had never been to… It means only that we failed to pay due attention to these countries before, and, to a certain extent, it is only now that we are starting a full-fledged and I hope mutually beneficial cooperation with the heads of these states and between our economies.** он отметил: **We mustn’t be shy and timid and be afraid of competition. We must boldly engage in the battle”.¶ In order to display its interest to the presence in the region Russia resorted to a number of un-common and spectacular actions.** In November 2008 a warship squadron with the fleet nuclear-powered cruiser “Peter the Great” of the Russian Navy as a flagship entered the territorial waters of US-hostile Venezuela to participate in joint naval exercises of the North Fleet of the Russian Federation Navy. Simultaneously, within the framework of the resumed patrolling of the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans two Russian long-range strategic bombers landed at a Venezuelan naval base.¶ **The so-called comeback of Russia to Latin America was to a great extent preconditioned by the “leftist drift” in the region which resulted in the emergence of the group of states that viewed the expanding relations with Russia as an important lever for strengthening their position in conflict relations with the USA**. Many of these countries perceived Russia as the successor of the former USSR might and influence, with the vision of a new world order of both sides being practically identical – it should be multilateral, not individually tailored to the interests of a single superpower. This position was set out in numerous joint documents signed at the summits – **practically all the leaders of the most prominent Latin American countries paid official visits to Moscow during the first decade of the 21st century.¶** The breakthrough happened also in the military and technical field. Starting from 2004 Venezuela has begun purchases of scale of the Russian arms to the amount of over $4bln. Russia established military and technical cooperation with other countries of the region apart from Venezuela: Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia also procured Russian military hardware.¶ **Russia tried to establish closer economic ties with its major partners in the region.** At the end of the decade **Russia’s oil and gas producing companies** LUKOIL and GASPROM **were already operating in Venezuela.** RUSAL made heavy investments in bauxite industry of Guyana. **ROSNEFT got its chunk for oil exploration in Cuban shelf of the Mexican Gulf**.¶ **Trade between Russia and the countries of the region has been roaring recently – over the last decade trade turnover has tripled and amounted to $15bln** [4]. However, despite the qualitative changes in the structure of Russian export – the share of machinery and equipment has a little increased – it still leaves much to be desired. Take Brazil, for example: mineral fertilizers have made up 90% of Russian export, while Brazil has been exporting to Russia mostly meat and tropical goods.¶ Largely, Brazil has always been the weakest link of Russia’s regional policy despite its participation in the BRIC group. At any rate, the role of Brazil in Russia’s foreign policy is much smaller than those of China and India. It should be recognized that Russia has failed so far to establish strategic partnership with Brazil, which had been planned for as early as 1997.¶ It can be largely attributed to the fact that Russian leadership has no priority system in interacting with this country. The latter, from our perspective, is explained by poor understanding of how much inter-complimentary could be the interests of the two resource-rich countries in the decades to come.¶ Unfortunately, China, and lately India have been much more economically active in the region than Russia, filling the niches in the market that could have been well filled by Russia.¶ Another question is why Brazilian dimension of Russian foreign policy is much weaker than the Chinese one? Why do we transfer to China, the relationships with which in the 20th century were abundant with conflicts including the armed ones, unique military aircraft building technologies, while denying this to Brazil with which we have never had conflicts or clashes on the international arena?¶ Perhaps, it is the residual principle inherent of the USSR leadership and successfully inherited in 1990-s by the Russian leadership that is applied to this region. But, while the USSR used to have Cuba as a strategic partner, the Russian Federation, having curtailed the ties with the Island of Freedom, didn’t bother to start looking for new partners and paid as little attention to the relations with Brazil as with any other Latin American country.¶ If Russia is really interested in serious and politically influential partners, then it is the Brazil dimension that should be prioritized as the major vector of Russian policy in the region. It means establishing a special system of partnership which will include an overhaul of the current system of trade and economic relations, an introduction of a new system of preferential terms of advanced know-how transfer and exchange, particularly in aerospace field. For that sake it’s necessary to maximally intensify the relations with Brazil’s leadership and take them to a higher level, with the head of state or the government taking control of it.¶ However, the growing understanding of the Russian upper echelons of power of the necessity to shift the focus of economic cooperation with the countries of the region on to scientific and technical sphere arouses certain optimism. It is in the field of advanced technologies where Russia is most competitive, and no wonder that the main emphasis during the April 2010 visit of President Medvedev to the countries of the region was laid on this very issue.¶ Low competitiveness of Russia vis-à-vis other countries undertaking huge efforts with a view to building up their political and economic position in this region continues to persist. Besides, our investment capability is also much lower than that of USA, China, EU and even India.¶ Nonetheless, in spite of the difficulties, both objective and subjective, **the trend of Russia’s presence expansion in the region may gain further momentum in the forthcoming decades, provided adequate efforts are taken. In this case Latin American dimension of Russian foreign policy has all chances to make it a separate independent direction which can win Russia new beneficial partners and enhance its position in a nascent multi-polar world.**

**B. Link – Russia would hate the plan – they perceive the United States encroaching on it’s sphere of influence**

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**(Leon, American Enterprise Institute, 3/11/13, “Structure and context in US-Russian relations at the outset of Barack Obama's second term”, http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/europe/structure-and-context-in-us-russian-relations-at-the-outset-of-barack-obamas-second-term/, 7/6/13, PD)**

**After his election as president in 2000, Vladimir Putin effectively amended this national agenda with an overarching metagoal—the recovery of economic, political, and geostrategic assets lost by the Soviet state in the 1991 antitotalitarian revolution**. Although never spelled out formally, in retrospect this objective—and the set of policies that stemmed from it—**has been prosecuted with enough determination, coherence, and consistency to fully earn it the title of the “Putin Doctrine**.” Domestically, **the doctrine has guided the reclaiming of the “commanding heights” of the economy** (first and foremost, the oil and natural gas industries) and the reestablishing of control over politics, the courts, and national television, where most Russian get their news**. In foreign and security policy, the doctrine has amounted to a reinterpretation of Russia’s three geostrategic imperatives, making their implementation and maintenance considerably more assertive than many of those who originally articulated these goals had intended**. The Nuclear Superpower **The imperative of preserving its nuclear superpower status accounts for the enormous value Russia has assigned to maintaining strategic parity with the only other nuclear superpower, the** United States. Hence, Russia’s eagerness to engage in strategic arms control negotiations. Conversely**, Moscow vehemently opposes anything it believes would weaken strategic parity with the United States**. This explains the Kremlin’s steadfast resistance to US/NATO missile defense in Europe—the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). As a result, countless protestations by top US and NATO officials, including personal appeals by the last two American presidents to their Russian counterparts affirming that the system poses no threat to Russia’s nuclear deterrent, have been in vain**. They could not have been otherwise: whatever other national security arguments Russia puts forward in support of its hostility to missile defense, the key reason for this implacable antagonism, as Vladimir Putin said in his speech at the Foreign Ministry this past July, is the fact that missile defense allegedly** “upsets the strategic balance”[2]—that is, **weakens Russia’s status as a nuclear superpower**. A secondary but symbolically important (and financially rewarding) pillar of Russia’s nuclear superpower status is the export of nuclear technologies. The state nuclear energy corporation, RosAtom, has been busily selling nuclear technology and currently has contracts for the sale of nuclear reactors to China, Turkey, India, Belarus, and Bangladesh. **Iran has been a particularly attractive customer, with the construction of the $1 billion Bushehr nuclear power plant completed against US wishes, not only underscoring Russia’s nuclear technological capacity but also demonstrating Moscow’s willingness to assert its policies in the face of Washington’s resistance.** A Great Power **This assertion, along with an active recovery of former Soviet geostrategic assets, is a central element of the great-power objective as the Putin Doctrine interprets it**. Hence, **Russia has pursued former Soviet (and mostly anti-US) clients in** the Middle East, **Latin America**, and Asia. Emblematic of this policy have been the maintenance of a supply-and-repair facility in the Syrian port of Tartus and Putin’s visit to Cuba in December 2000, the first by a Soviet or Russian leader since Leonid Brezhnev’s trip there in 1974**. In the same vein, the Dmitry Medvedev–Hugo Chávez summit in Caracas in 2008 was the first in Russian or Soviet history**. With loans extended by Russia, Venezuela became a major importer of Russian conventional arms and equipment. **The Putin Doctrine leaves little room for compromise with the United States when the latter appears to Moscow to be encroaching on—or belittling or challenging—Russia’s status as a great power.** The Kremlin’s use of the UN Security Council to weaken or block US initiatives has risen steadily: in the 1990s, Russia cast two vetoes in the Security Council, but between 2000 and 2012, it wielded its veto eight times. **The cultivation and protection of former Soviet clients, who are also often current buyers of Russian technology and weapons, have increased Russia’s visibility** in the Middle East, where the Soviet Union used to enjoy a great deal of influence—**much, if not most of it, as a counterbalance to the United States**. For example, Russia thrice has vetoed UN Security Council resolutions calling for sanctions against Syria, in effect protecting Bashar al-Assad’s murderous regime.

#### And - Russian influence key to credible BRIC rise --- solves proxy wars that escalate

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Perhaps the lack of a US tradition for relating to the world in terms of multi- power politics is most strongly illustrated in Latin America, where the US has traditionally been the dominant power. Historically, where the US has focused on Latin America’s relationships with extra-regional actors, it has been primarily to exclude them, as illustrated by the opposition to 19th century European adventurism in the region, enshrined in the famous Monroe Doctrine, or in the Cold War struggle to prevent the Soviet Union from establishing client states in the region. The end of the cold war and the increasing viability of intercontinental economic relationships in the 1990s redefined Latin America’s relationship with the US and the world, at the very moment in which the US and its approach to democracy and development seemed most dominant. Reduced costs associated with the containerization of shipping, new communication and computing technology, and truly global financial markets created opportunities and imperatives for Latin America to participate in commerce with other regions, not only exporting its products, and importing goods from around the world, but also participating in integrated global production chains, attracting foreign capital, and building new ties that begun to undermine the historic pattern in which primarily US-dominated institutions invested in the region, purchased Latin American commodities, and sold Latin America US manufactured goods. In the 1990s, the principal extra-regional actors in Latin America were Europe and Japan, and to a lesser extent, South Korea. Because the new actors were not geopolitical adversaries of the US, and because their ties were principally commercial, the strategic implications of the new dynamic received relatively little attention in the US. Since the early 2000s, however, as Russia, Iran, China and India have also made inroads in the region, US policymakers have registered growing concern. 2 The emergence or re-emergence of external actors in Latin America such as Russia, China, India and Iran represents a new paradigm for the US, and for the region. On one hand, there has arguably not been a serious competition between multiple outside powers for influence in Latin America since those between the US, Spanish, French, English, and Portuguese, largely ending in the 19 th century. On the other hand, the strategic imperatives and considerations of the new competition are primarily economic in nature, rather than ideological or military, as was the case during the Cold War. The purpose of this article is to analyze the dynamics between the emerging new set of external actors in Latin America with an emphasis on identifying the characteristics and dynamics of those interactions, as well as possible opportunities and challenges arising from them. Emerging Multi-Power Competition in Latin America. Multi-power competition in Latin America in the context of globalization differs in many ways from the competition between states that characterized the 15 th Century system of Italian City States that Machiavelli wrote about in The Prince, 3 or the 16 th -19 th Century system of European states. In 21 st Century Latin America, the goals of the actors are different, corresponding to changes in that which has strategic value in the contemporary international system: access to commodities, technology, markets for goods, and certain symbolic and ideological objectives which leaders hope will provide benefits with respect to internal audiences, or in a broader global struggles for position. Moreover, differences in what each external actor in Latin America is looking for and why, create the possibility for complex patterns of cooperation and competition. The interaction between the new actors is driven by two overarching dynamics: (1) On traditional geopolitical issues, a series of coinciding cleavages divide the actors into two camps, with a strategically important shifting middle, depending on the issue. (2) On commercial issues, such as access to markets, sources of supply, and technology, a multi-way competition prevails, with national governments supporting their companies, in pursuit of strategic objectives such as national development or simply regime survival. The two dynamics are related in ways that depend on the initiative of each actor, since governments use alignment on geopolitical issues to secure commercial objectives, and growing alignment on commercial interests may impact positions on geopolitical issues. Although there will be various types of violence within, and perhaps between, states in Latin America, it is important to emphasize, that the focus of interaction between states of the region and external actors will be primarily securing an advantage commerce and national development, rather than in war, with competitions for the signing of trade accords, and technology sharing agreements, investment, the granting of privileged access to develop a nation’s mineral and hydrocarbon resources, or who supports whom in multilateral institutions. It is possible that external powers could become involved in a proxy war, in an attempt to hold up a regime in which they have strategic commercial interests, but such prospects remain distant at the present time. Coinciding Cleavages on Geopolitical Issues. Traditional geopolitical issues will still tend to divide external actors in Latin America into two camps, although the lineup of actors will change according to the issue. On issues of democratization and human rights, the US and Europe are likely to be generally aligned in advancing an agenda that respects traditional Western norms, while Iran and the PRC, and often Russia, will emphasize the right of each state in the region to determine its own internal politics. India, depending on the specific issue, may or may not press for respect for such norms. Within this broad alignment, of course, differences will still exist, with Europe emphasizing human rights issues in select countries, such as Colombia, where the US does not, or overlooking human rights issues in others, such as Cuba, where the US places emphasis. The pursuit of commercial goals by some actors may motivate them to avoid positions on geopolitical issues that would separate them from potential business partners. The second major cleavage dividing external actors in Latin America is the question of the developed world (North) versus the developing world (South). Particularly with left-of-center regimes in Latin America, countries such as China, India and Iran emphasize their common “South-South” ties as countries in development, generally in political meetings indirectly pursuing commercial deals for their companies. Russia often fits uneasily into this coalition, seeking to define itself, in its relations with populist countries such as Venezuela, as an up and coming power (eg. Part of the “BRIC” nations), or as alternative to the status quo powers (the US and Europe), even though it has not been traditionally categorized as a “developing” nation. Within the political space created by such coinciding cleavages, Latin America also serves as a target for important, but differing internal and international agendas pursued by each actor. For the PRC, Latin America’s principal tie to domestic politics is Taiwan. 12 of the 23 nations in the world which continue to recognize the Republic of China (ROC) as the legitimate Chinese government are found in Latin America. Externally, the PRC also seeks to participate in the region’s institutions, such as the IADB and OAS, and prevent another power such as the US from dominating those institutions, or other regional structures, in such a way that could shut it out of the region and jeopardize its strategic commercial goals. None of other external actors in the region explicitly oppose these goals, but rather, each pursues its own goals in parallel. This include Iran, for which support from Latin America reinforces the international stature of its leadership in the Iranian regime’s messianic efforts to advance its brand of radical Islam with Iran at its center. In a more pragmatic sense, Latin American ties, including financial institutions such as the International Development Bank in Venezuela, direct airline flights, factories in remote areas, and technology collaboration, help Iran to circumvent international sanctions to develop a nuclear capabilities, and possibly fund and create a logistics base for terrorist operations that could reach the United States, in the event that Iran wishes to wage such a conflict in the future. For Russia, in a manner similar to Iran, Latin American ties help the current regime to demonstrate to a domestic audience that Russia is once again playing a significant international role, harkening back to its height of Cold War power as the heart of the Soviet Union. Latin America also provides the platform for Russia to generate counter-pressures to US activities in Eastern Europe, the Caspian sea, and Central Asia, which Russia regards as its sphere of influence, such as November 2008, when Russia sent supersonic Tu-160 bombers and a squadron of ships to Venezuela for maneuvers in the Caribbean, as a counterpoint to the US projection of power in the Black Sea during the succession crisis in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Because of the shared “anti-western” focus and because the specific geopolitical agendas pursued by actors such as Russia, India and China in Latin America generally complement each other, these nations are not likely to come into conflict over their courtship of populist regimes such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia. The critical exception to this harmony, however, involves strategic commercial issues, such as which nation gets to develop the preponderance of Venezuela’s petroleum in the Orinoco belt, or the significant deposits of iron and lithium, and perhaps uranium, in Bolivia. Commercial Competition. With respect to commerce, the goals of each external actor are defined by its position within the global economy and other elements of its national situation, as interpreted by its leadership. The PRC, because of its position as a global manufacturer, and because of its aggressive process of capital formation, looks to Latin America as a source of commodities, while its attitude toward markets focuses it on owning key parts of the production chain, or having strong contractual presence there where possible, as evidenced in interest by Chinese companies in Peruvian, Bolivian and Chilean mines, or Venezuelan and Ecuadorian oil fields. China’s combination of a large population and limited agricultural land also drives an interest in Latin America as a source of foodstuffs, particularly in countries with large tracts of land usable for agriculture, such as Brazil and Argentina, which have become significant soy exporters for China. Neither Russia, Iran, nor India have export-led manufacturing sectors which generate a level of demand for commodities similar to that of China. Nonetheless, as the Indian economy continues to grow, its companies will increasingly come into contact with those of China in Latin America as part of their global search for commodities. In the case of Russia and Iran, both have significant petroleum industries which them to participate in the petroleum sector of Latin America as part of larger global business strategies. With respect to Latin American markets, China’s position in the world economy as manufacturer makes its ability to sell its products abroad and move up the value added chain a strategically critical objective, particularly as growth in traditional markets for Chinese exports, such as the US, Europe, and Japan, has slowed. Moreover, the middle-income nature of Latin America’s $3 trillion, 500 million person market, and its sensitivity to price creates particular opportunities as the PRC seeks to gain experience in a range of strategically important sectors such as cars, aircraft, computers, telecommunications, military goods, and space. For similar reasons, Latin America is also an important market for India in select sectors, such as high-end manufactures and technology-intensive goods, laying the basis for an emerging competition in this area. Russia also competes for select segments of the high-end manufacturing market in Latin America, such as military end items and nuclear technology. Although Iran sells very few goods to Latin America, those purchases are important for its efforts to break free of the international isolation imposed on that country for its pursuit of a nuclear capability. Beyond specific competitions for resources and markets, there are also areas in which the commercial objectives of external actors in Latin America coincide, creating opportunities for future collaboration. All generally benefit, for example, from efficient infrastructure in the region, although they may differ on the focus, with India and China arguably benefitting more than Russia and Iran from improved ports, roads and rail networks oriented toward the Pacific ocean. All generally benefit from respect for contractual and property rights, and predictable legal, regulatory, and political environments in the countries with which they wish to do business, although new entrants, such as China, Russia, India, and Iran, also tend to benefit initially from significant changes, since their commercial holdings in these countries have traditionally been eclipsed by US and European companies, and changes such as those brought about by Latin American populist movements tend to open up new opportunities. On the other hand, such change also opens up potentially destabilizing new competitions between these players to see who will benefit most from the new actors and new rules of the game. Sectorial Competitions The currently emerging competitions between external powers in key Latin American business and technology sectors are likely to intensify, with the possibility for combinations of direct competition and cooperation as the situation dictates, and with each country leveraging the weight of its government where possible. The key players, their relative strengths, and their level of engagement will be different in each sector, reflecting the differing situation of each nation, and its companies, in the global economy. Emerging competitions include those for (1) oil and gas resources, (2) mineral resources, (3) agricultural goods, (4) high-end manufactured goods, (5) military goods, (6) infrastructure projects, and (7) telecom and technology services.

#### C. Impact BRIC is key to global multilateralism --- solves all impacts – food security, disease, peak oil and global warming

Biswas 11 (Aparajita, Professor at the Centre for African Studies at the University of Mumbai, "Foreign Relations of India: BRICS and India, BRICS in Africa," International Affairs, January 6, en.rian.ru/international\_affairs/20110601/164362547.html)

Recently, India’s Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, was in Brazil to attend both the second Summit of BRIC and IBSA Summit, held in 2010. For India, these two groups are extremely important, considering that both aim to collectively boost bargaining power and clout on global issues, and also strengthen economic and political ties among the member-countries on the lines of South-South co-operation. In fact, India took the initiative to call for improving the importance of BRIC and IBSA as groups.(11)Dr. Manmohan Singh called for closer co-operation in the fields of energy and food security, as well as tapping into the potential of other sectors such as trade and investment, science and technology, and infrastructure. He added that pooling together each other’s experiences could lead to more inclusive growth. "We are four large countries with abundant resources, large populations and diverse societies. We aspire for rapid growth for ourselves and for an external environment that is conducive to our development goals”.(12) Co-operation on the economic front is one of the focus areas of India’s policy towards BRIC. It believes that global challenges can only be addressed by co-operative effort, with the full and equal participation of major and emerging powers and economies. For India, on the one hand, cooperation with other BRIC member-states provides an excellent opportunity to share its development experiences with them as well as learn from their experiences. This is more so since they share common challenges as developing countries and global challenges often affect them in a similar way. In addition to discussions about how to respond to the financial crisis, India exchanged ideas and experiences on food security, agriculture, disease, foreign aid, energy and global warming. Sharing these experiences not only helps the BRIC member-states themselves, it also allows them to share experiences and “best practices” with the developing world and thereby expand South-South cooperation.